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The purpose of this paper is to examine the phenomenon of the Korean Wave (hallyu) in China and 
explore its implications for the Korea-China relationship. As a cultural phenomenon, hallyu had a 
significant bearing on the perception of Korea by Chinese people. Korean TV dramas, films, and pop 
music served as a special window through which Chinese audiences gained an understanding of 
Korean society and formed a sense of cultural familiarity towards Korea. It also helped generate 
cultural synchronization between the two countries. As an economic phenomenon, it stimulated 
collaboration as well as competition between the Korean and Chinese cultural industries. 
Collaboration in the production and distribution of TV shows and films continues to be widened and 
diversified. Finally, hallyu served as fertile soil for cultural politics, as it was often entangled with 
disputes in other realms of the Korea-China relationship, including such issues as cultural heritage, 
history, and nationalism. 
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Over the past few decades, the Korea-China relationship has progressed at an impressive 
pace. Since China started implementing an open door policy, Korea and China have been in 
the process of rebuilding friendly relations as neighbors, casting away remnants of the Cold 
War period. Especially, the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 between the two 
countries accelerated mutual exchange and cooperation in all areas encompassing politics, 
economy, society and culture. However, the relationship has not been all smooth sailing. 
Despite overall improvements, friction and conflicts emerge from time to time.  
This paper is an attempt to examine, with a focus on the phenomenon of the ‘Korean 
Wave’ (hallyu, hereafter),1 the complicated nature of the Korea-China relationship over the 
last two decades. There are reasons that I believe hallyu can serve as a useful window for this. 
First of all, as a cultural phenomenon, it can have a significant bearing on the perception of 
Korea by Chinese people. Korean popular culture is the principal channel through which 
Chinese people obtain information and construct images of Korean society, and for that 
matter, has a substantial cultural implication for the Korea-China relationship. Secondly, as a 
phenomenon intimately connected with cultural industries, it will let us clearly see the criss-
crossing of economic cooperation and competition between Korean and Chinese industries. 
Thirdly, hallyu serves as fertile soil for cultural politics. It goes beyond the realm of popular 
                                                          
* This work was supported by the Research Grant of Kwangwoon University in 2005. 
1 Hallyu can mean different things to different people, but my focus is concentrated on the wide 
popularity of Korean TV dramas, pop music, and films and the emergence of passionate fandoms of 
Korean stars in Asia and beyond.  
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culture and economics and is often entangled with national pride, cultural nationalism, and 
the like. In this respect, it has a notable political implication for the Korea-China relationship.  
Before moving on to discuss its cultural, economic, and political implications, let me start 
with a brief overview of the emergence and development of the hallyu phenomenon in China.  
 
 
2. THE RISE OF HALLYU IN CHINA 
 
Hallyu in China is mostly about Korean TV dramas. Korean pop culture’s entry into 
China officially began with the export of drama series “Jealousy” (Jiltu) and “Eyes at 
Daybreak” (Yeomyeongui Nundongja) in 1993. However, the actual impact became 
noticeable after “What is Love (Sarangi Mwogillae) was broadcast on Channel 1 of China 
Central Television (CCTV, hereafter) in 1997. It recorded the second highest viewer ratings 
ever among imported foreign drama serials. This show was televised once more during prime 
time on CCTV’s Channel 2 in 1998 upon viewers’ request. Another popular show was “A 
Wish Upon a Star” (Byeoreun Nae Gaseume), which was broadcast in 1998 on Pheonix TV, 
an affiliate of Hong Kong’s Star TV. This show also recorded high ratings in mainland China 
as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The main male character, Jae-wook Ahn, became a well-
recognized hallyu star thanks to the popularity of this drama series and the show’s theme 
song, ‘Forever,’ which he sang himself. 
Since Korean dramas guaranteed high ratings, Chinese TV broadcasting stations began to 
competitively import popular Korean shows. Trendy drama series such as “Tomato,” 
“Autumn Fable” (Gaeuldonghwa), “Hotelier,” home dramas such as “Men of a Bath House” 
(Mogyoktangjip Namjadeul) and “Miss Mermaid” (Ineoagassi), historical series like “Ladies 
of the Palace” (Yeoincheonha) and “A Jewel in the Palace” (Daejanggeum), and sitcoms like 
“Soonpoong Clinic” (Sunpungsanbuingwa) were broadcast to Chinese homes all over the 
country (Gwak, 2005; Gang and Yi, 2009).  
The so-called “drama hallyu” reached its pinnacle with the Daejanggeum fever2 in 2005 
and started to steeply decline in popularity in 2006. This was largely due to a decrease in the 
number of shows that passed the stricter screening standards the Chinese government started 
to enforce on foreign TV shows starting in early 2006, and the restriction on the number of 
Korean drama imports as a result of a policy to diversify import countries.3  The rapid 
increase in export prices of Korean TV shows4 and the diversification of Chinese viewers’ 
appetite were all contributing factors (Gang and Yi, 2009: 176). After a few years of slump, 
however, “drama hallyu” seems to be on a path towards recovery (see Table 1).  
Recently, separate from the Korean drama series that are shown on TV stations, there has 
been an increase in people watching shows on the internet. Watching pirated VCDs or DVDs 
and downloading shows illegally have been widespread in China. Nonetheless, over the last 
few years, new internet pay-per-view and free viewing services have been launched: in 2010, 
Chinese portal site Sohu.com set up a section exclusively for Korean drama series; in 2011, 
                                                          
2 Daejanggeum, which was broadcast on Hunan Satellite TV, received an average of 4% ratings, 
making it the most-watched show nationally in its time slot (Jin, 2008:3).   
3 The percentage of foreign drama series broadcast on public television decreased from 17.1% in 2007 
to 11.1% in 2009 (KOFICE, 2010:18).  
4 The unit price of exported Korean drama series greatly increased from US$840 per series in 2001 to 
US$4,921 in 2005. It fell to US$3,183 in 2008 (Gwon and Gim, 2009:21).  





Table 1. Korean Drama Series and Episodes Imported to China, 2003-2008 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
No. of Series/Episodes 9/175 8/154 29/571 14/245 16/305 28/523 
Note: refer to Gang and Yi (2009:168-171). 
 
PPTV, the largest video-sharing channel in China, began to offer Korean shows through their 
hallyu section. These internet services are expected to help encourage the watching of 
Korean dramas (KOFICE, 2011:26-7).  
Another key element of hallyu in China is K-pop. Chinese audiences became familiar 
with K-pop through TV drama theme songs like Jae-wook Ahn’s ‘Forever.’ Yet, It started to 
receive wider attention through radio programs. A Beijing FM station began playing K-pop 
on a program, “Seoul Music Hall” (Hancheng Yinyueting in Chinese), in 1996. Thanks to 
this two-hour long weekly program, many K-pop music fans emerged. Jumping on the 
bandwagon of K-pop’s success, numerous radio stations in China created programs that 
covered K-pop exclusively. For instance, the Beijing Traffic Station began to broadcast K-
pop on its daily program, “Nighttime at Han River” (Hanjiangzhiye in Chinese) in 1999. The 
China National Radio created an hour-long program, “Listen to Korea” (Lingting Hanguo in 
Chinese),5 in 2001. This was part of a strategy by these broadcasting stations to increase 
listener ratings. These examples indicate that the spread of K-pop hallyu was accelerated by 
the needs of Chinese broadcasting companies.  
Among Chinese teenagers, Korean dance music was tremendously popular. In 1998, a 
famous Korean boy band H.O.T. surprised music critics by selling tens of thousands of 
copies over a short period, despite being the first Korean singers to release an album in China. 
NRG also sold as many copies as H.O.T. when they released their album in 1999. Clon’s 
Beijing concert in 1999 was a surprise success and H.O.T.’s Beijing concert in 2000 also 
attracted a big crowd. The explosive reaction that Chinese teenagers showed towards these 
concerts led the Chinese media to shed a spotlight on the hallyu phenomenon.  
The potential of the Chinese music market attracted many Korean singers. There were a 
number of popular solo artists such as Jae-wook Ahn, Jung-hyun Lee, Steve Seungjun Yoo, 
Rain, Na-ra Jang, and Keun-suk Jang, but Korean idol musical bands were the dominant 
force. H.O.T. and NRG sparked the Korean dance music fever, which was passed on through 
Baby V.O.X., S.E.S., Fin. K.L., TVXQ, Super Junior, and so on. Their influence was not 
confined to music, but overspilled into the lifestyles and fashions of Chinese fans. Teenagers 
styled themselves after Korean singers, imitating their clothing styles, wearing the same 
jewelry and dyeing their hair yellow, which became a social phenomenon covered 
extensively by the media. 
It seems as though K-pop hallyu, after a stagnant few years, has gained momentum once 
again. Similar to how K-pop became popular worldwide by people sharing music videos and 
information through Youtube and other social networking services, many video-sharing 
websites like Tudou and Youku in China have contributed significantly towards the second 
coming of K-pop. K-pop shows, music videos and other appearances of popular singers are 
instantaneously shared in real time through these sites. Popular Chinese portal sites have 
                                                          
5 This program was created by a Korean businessman Yoon-Ho Kim, CEO of Ujeon Soft. He also 
produced “Seoul Music Hall” program and played a crucial role in expanding the K-pop market to 
China.  
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exclusive sections for K-pop which deliver the most recent K-pop news. Chinese fans can 
now watch all programs produced by Mnet, the largest Korean music channel, on a famous 
Chinese video-sharing site, Baomihuawang. Regardless of whether they perform regularly in 
China, idol groups such as Girls’ Generation, Big Bang, 2NE1, f(x), 2PM, Wonder Girls, F.T. 
Island, SS501, SHINee, KARA, T-ara, CNBLUE all boast a large number of Chinese fans.  
In the case of films, there are only a limited number of Korean films released in Chinese 
movie theaters. The first Korean film introduced to Chinese audiences was “A Story of 
Marriage” (Gyeolhon Iyagi) which was released in Shanghai in 1998. “Out Live” 
(Bicheonmu, 2000) and “The Warrior” (Musa, 2003), jointly produced by Korea and China, 
were received favorably by Chinese movie-goers. “The Classic” (2003), the first film to be 
exported by a profit-sharing system, also fared well. “Daisy” (2006) attracted Chinese 
audiences thanks to the participation of Hong Kong director Andrew Lau and top hallyu stars 
Ji-hyun Jun and Woo-sung Jung. So far, the top box-office record is held by “Late Autumn” 
(Manchu), which earned 64.8 million yuan.6 Before that, “D-war” held the record at 29.6 
million yuan, trailed closely by “Sector 7” (Chilgwanggu), “7th Grade Civil Servant” 
(Chilgeup Gongmuwon), “200 Pounds Beauty” (Minyeoneun Goerowo), and “The Host” 
(Goemul) (Korea Film Council, 2011: 135).  
It should be noted that Korean films are more widely known than the number of film 
releases indicates. The bad news is that watching pirated products is still a common practice 
in China. Many Korean films meet Chinese audiences only via illegal VCDs and DVDs, as 
in the case of “My Sassy Girl” (Yeopgijeogin Geunyeo). The good news is that the amount of 
films legally shown on the internet is rising. Thanks to the growth of the internet in China, 
there has been a substantial increase in demand for all-media copyrights of Korean films. 
“The Seventh Grade Civil Servant,” “The Good, The Bad, The Weird” (Joeun Nom, 
Nappeun Nom, Isanghan Nom) and “Jeon Woochi: The Taoist Wizard” are some examples. 
As internet services continue to grow, it is anticipated that competition among Chinese 




3. CULTURAL FAMILIARITY AND SYNCHRONIZATION 
 
Hallyu has significant implications for the Korea-China relationship since it affects 
Chinese people’s perception of Korea. In this part of the paper, I will underline the 
importance of hallyu from two perspectives: cultural familiarity and cultural synchronization.  
When hallyu began to attract attention in the early 2000s, Korea itself was not of 
particular interest to China. It is true that the story of Korea’s economic miracle, ’86 Seoul 
Asian Games, ’88 Seoul Olympics, and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 
boosted interest in Korea among Chinese people (Jang, 2003). Yet, as one Chinese scholar 
aptly put it, “China had no time to spare for neighboring countries, because its eyes only 
traveled across the Pacific to rest in the United States”(Kuang, 2002:41). Economically and 
politically, Korea was not important enough to attract nation-wide attention. In the sphere of 
popular culture, however, it was a different story. Chinese people felt a strong presence of 
Korea, as they were exposed to Korean television shows, films, and songs in everyday life.  
                                                          
6 According to the Korea Film Council and the Korea Copyright Commission, the reason behind Late 
Autumn’s success in China was the effective shutdown of illegal online distribution.   





Hallyu was a convenient channel through which Chinese people gained an understanding 
of Korea. The perception gained through pop culture does not always correspond to the 
reality of Korea. Nevertheless, as one Chinese scholar emphasized, pop culture became a “de 
facto unique window through which an absolute majority of the Chinese understood Korea” 
(Zhang, 2006:144). Korean drama series gave them a glimpse into Korean family life and 
society, history and culture, in a more vivid and emotionally charged way than through news 
reports focusing on facts. 
Both critics and the public are deeply divided in their evaluation of Korean pop culture: 
on one hand, Korean pop culture is viewed as a cheap imitation of Western pop culture 
which has managed to enjoy a temporary spike in popularity; on the other hand, the Korean 
cultural industry is spoken highly of for its creativity, mixing Western and Eastern culture 
with a distinctive Korean color. The respective reactions towards Korean TV dramas, films, 
and K-pop are also divided. In the case of drama series, for example, some Chinese praise 
Korean dramas’ excellent scenarios, refined and detailed portrayal of emotions, sophisticated 
camera work, good-looking actors and their stellar performances, great soundtracks, and so 
on; others criticize the slow pace at which stories unfold, lack of variety in subjects, 
stereotypical characters, and overuse of coincidental plots.  
No matter how Korean pop culture is evaluated by individual Chinese, it has undoubtedly 
contributed to the improvement of the Korea-China relationship by helping the Chinese form 
a sense of familiarity towards Korea. While there are a variety of elements that help 
constitute familiarity, two elements stand out. The first one is related to the past that the two 
countries share. It is what Chinese people call Eastern culture (dongfang wenhua in Chinese). 
They believe that Eastern culture, with Confucian traditions at its core, underlies Korean pop 
culture. The other one is related to the present. They feel that the life depicted in Korean 
dramas, for example, is not much different from what they experience daily.  
To Chinese people, Eastern culture is visible in Korean pop culture. The form Korean TV 
dramas take can be Western, but they believe the content carries a strong Eastern flavor.  
 
Korea is a country with an archetypal Eastern cultural tradition. The customs, social relationships, 
and cultural meanings revealed in Korean drama series awaken people to the unique meaning and 
charm of Eastern culture (People’s Daily, November 4th, 2001). 
 
Korean culture is similar to Chinese culture in many ways, both being part of Eastern culture. Thus, 
it is easier for the Chinese to embrace it, compared to Western culture (China Youth Daily, October 
8th, 2003). 
 
Korean pop culture is a kind of mirror that lets Chinese people reflect on their own 
culture. Through it, they have come to believe that Korea is an exemplary Asian country 
which has succeeded, unlike China, in preserving its tradition despite rapid modernization 
(Onishi, 2006).7 Of course it also leads them to find differences between the two countries: 
the patriarchal family culture often depicted in Korean shows, for instance, is odd and 
anachronistic to the contemporary Chinese. Yet, they are also reminded of their lost 
traditions and become nostalgic for the past (which they believe is pure and beautiful in such 
reflexive moments), as they see characters in Korean drama episodes representing desirable 
                                                          
7 In a sense, Chinese see what they want to see in Korean dramas and films. They tend to pay attention 
to what is lacking in China.   
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Eastern moral values such as respect for the elderly, family bonds, and loyalty between 
friends (Yun, 2006:51-54). Such cultural connectedness leads them to form a feeling of 
familiarity towards Korea.  
The Chinese find similarities in the present, too. To them, what drama characters go 
through in everyday life, agonize over, and wish for are similar to their own experiences. 
Every modernizing society experiences huge shifts in relationships and values. Korean TV 
dramas do extremely well in portraying the troubles and issues that occur in the process (Xu, 
2005).  
 
Since the Chinese think that what Korea has gone through in the process of economic and social 
transformation is what China is facing now or will face in the future, they also tend to believe that 
the family life and social situations represented in Korean dramas are and will be the reality of 
Chinese families and society (Zhang, 2006:148). 
 
It is no wonder that Chinese viewers feel empathy towards the characters representing all 
that is going on in their own lives. Such empathy, along with the aforementioned feeling of 
connectedness through Eastern culture, strengthens Chinese people's sense of cultural 
familiarity towards Korea and Koreans.8  
Another important effect of hallyu relating to the relationship between the two countries 
is cultural synchronization. Today, Korean pop culture is delivered to China without much of 
a time lag. Not only has the period of time before pop culture content is exported been 
shortened, but it has also become possible to consume Korean TV shows, films and songs in 
real time thanks to innovations in information and communications technology. Due to such 
simultaneous consumption of cultural products, transnational convergence in cultural tastes 
and needs occurs. The craze for Korean fashion, beauty treatments and plastic surgery is a 
good example of this phenomenon.  
To Chinese youth who have been influenced by hallyu, Korea has become synonymous 
with ‘fashionable’ or ‘stylish’ (Onish, 2006). The new generation’s fashion follows Korean 
fashion trends (Gim and Bak, 2004). The fashion of Korean male singers like H.O.T., dyeing 
their hair yellow and wearing wide leg hip hop pants, became popular amongst trend-
sensitive young Chinese for some time. Straightened or curled hair, bootcut pants and 
platform shoes of Korean female stars also became hot items. In major cities like Beijing, 
shops that exclusively sold Korean clothing and accessories cropped up all over the place. 
Encouraged by this trend, many Korean clothing brands have started to expand into the 
Chinese market. E-LAND and BASIC HOUSE are raising brand recognition by using hallyu 
stars as models (Hyeon, Bak, and Jang, 2010:249).  
Cultural synchronization is also apparent in the beauty treatment and plastic surgery 
industry. Korean cosmetic brands and cosmetology are recognized throughout the Asian 
region. Korean cosmetic brands are widely loved in China. ‘Amore Pacific,’ ‘Hercyna,’ ‘The 
Faceshop,’ ‘VOV,’ ‘Charmzone’ are all brands that Chinese women buy (Lu, 2007:49). In 
plastic surgery, Korea has become the “capital of the world” (Kim, 2012). With the spread of 
hallyu, Korean top stars, such as Tae-hee Kim, Hee-sun Kim, Hye-kyo Song, and Ji-woo 
Choi, are upheld as standards of Asian beauty. Among Asian women, it is a fad to imitate 
                                                          
8 Based on a survey conducted in Chinese cities, Rhee and Lee (2010) show that Korean media 
products such as TV dramas, films, and music have played an important role in enhancing Chinese 
consumers’ understanding of and identification with Korea.  





these stars’ makeup styles and, on many occasions, come to Korea for plastic surgery.9 
Transnational convergence is happening not only with items that adorn one’s body (clothes, 
hair style, accessories), but also the body itself. 
From the perspective of Chinese people’s perception of Korea, Hallyu’s contribution to 
the improvement of the Korea-China relationship has been substantial. The relationship 
between the two countries has benefited greatly from the favorable atmosphere built by 
cultivating a sense of cultural affinity among Chinese people.   
 
 
4. INDUSTRIAL INTERESTS: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 
 
To fully appreciate hallyu’s implications for the Korea-China relationship, we need to 
place it in a broader context. The penetration of Korean cultural products into Chinese and 
other overseas markets began in the late 1990s when both Korea and China were facing 
serious challenges. For Korea, the chaotic state the economy was in after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis meant there was an urgent need for economic breakthroughs. In China, 
restructuring, downsizing, and other reform measures put media companies in sharp 
competition against each other for relatively cheap but high-quality programs that would 
guarantee high audience ratings. Hallyu, therefore, was considered a matter of great 
economic importance for both countries.  
Since the 1980s, as China became more open, the Chinese public’s interest and appetite 
for new culture expanded. This led to a rapid expansion in cultural industries. At the 
beginning of the reform, China's infrastructure for cultural industries was weak: black-and-
white television, let alone color TV, was a rare item for individual households to own. By 
2000, however, color television became a household necessity. In urban areas, the number of 
color TV sets each household owned reached 1.16 on average. VCD and DVD players also 
became household staples. There were merely 100 TV stations and 32 radio stations in 1978, 
but the numbers increased to 1,238 and 880 by 1996. While the number of broadcasting 
stations later fell sharply due to mergers and restructuring, TV and radio broadcasting 
became available to people all over the country and the number of channels individual 
households could choose from greatly increased. Moreover, from the mid-1990s, cable and 
satellite TV channels started to increase their market shares rapidly. In the case of cable TV, 
the number of subscribers rose to 100 million by 2003. These figures show that Chinese 
consumers’ demand for cultural products was expanding at a fast pace (Han, 2004:135-137).  
The amount of domestic cultural products had grown considerably in China,10 but not 
enough to satisfy the rising consumer demand. In addition, these products could not satisfy 
the diversified cultural tastes and appetite of consumers, because they were produced mainly 
for propaganda purposes.11 It was Hong Kong and Taiwan’s pop culture that first entered 
                                                          
9  This of course cannot be explained solely by hallyu effect. It is a combined result of Korea’s 
outstanding plastic surgery technology, relatively cheap cost, promotion programs and other 
contributing factors.  
10 For example, the number of TV drama series produced jumped approximately 52 times during 18 
years from 1980 to 1998 (Yi, 2004:180).  
11 Before the open-door policy, all forms of arts and culture were instrumental for socialist propaganda. 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party organized 
cultural intellectuals such as writers and artists into party-controlled institutions and let them produce 
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China to fill this gap. With the relaxation of the ban on foreign culture during the early phase 
of reform, soft popular culture including Deng Lijun’s songs, martial arts novels by such 
writers as Jin Yong and Gu Long, and romance novels by, for instance, Qiong Yao and San 
Mao spread like fire across the mainland through a variety of channels (Jeon, 2004; Jang 
2005). Drama series and other TV programs from Hong Kong and Taiwan also grew popular 
among Chinese audiences. Hong Kong films, especially martial arts and action films, were 
extremely popular in the mainland (Jeon, 2006). Films from Taiwan did not make much of 
an impression, but Taiwanese companies participated in joint ventures for cinema co-
production with Hong Kong and mainland China. Popular culture from outside the Greater 
China was also introduced to mainlanders. Japanese drama series and American films and 
rock music garnered considerable attention. Korean pop culture was introduced to the 
Chinese market in the mid-1990s, when such inflow of foreign cultural products was being 
accelerated.  
From the perspective of China’s cultural industries, hallyu possesses elements of 
cooperation as well as competition. In its initial stage, its cooperative side stood out. The 
rapid diffusion of Korean popular culture in early years could not have been possible without 
Chinese TV stations and other companies actively importing Korean drama series, music, 
and other cultural products. Hallyu was not a well-planned project on the part of Korean 
industries. It was rather a response to the call from the Chinese market.     
In the mid-1990s, China’s cultural industries were undergoing structural changes. Under 
the government’s protection over a long period of time, so many small-sized, inefficient, 
unproductive companies mushroomed. With an imminent worldwide economic crisis 
looming overhead in the late 1990s, the Chinese government launched a reform process in 
the media industry to induce corporate mergers and restructuring (Yi, 2004:173-179). Korean 
dramas, films and pop music entered the Chinese market when Chinese media companies 
were in urgent need of good programs that could help them survive the competition. 
Korean TV dramas were especially welcome. When some Korean drama series that had 
been introduced to test the water unexpectedly gained wild popularity, TV stations started to 
competitively import Korean shows, which they found were not only popular among Chinese 
audiences but also relatively cheap in price. Korean dramas, however, were a double-bladed 
knife to Chinese cultural industries.  
On the issue of importing Korean drama series, China’s broadcasting stations and drama 
production companies have different interests. It is rational for television broadcasting 
stations to increase imports of popular Korean series because they are in an intense 
competition for ratings in order to obtain high advertising revenue. However, the rise in 
imports of Korean and other foreign drama series dealt a blow to drama production 
companies that were already suffering from bad management conditions. Overall, while the 
Chinese drama industry did grow, 12  it had many problems such as bad production 
                                                          
only work that suited public interests. Under Mao’s China, art and cultural activities did not pursue 
economic profits. They were not “cultural industries” (wenhuachanye in Chinese) – “activities that 
provide popular cultural products and services to consumers through the market” – but “cultural 
undertakings” (wenhuashiye in Chinese) – “activities that supply art and cultural services to the public 
for free with financial support by the government” (Han, 2006:160-165).  
12 Starting in 2003, the scale of drama production surpassed 10,000 episodes every year for five years 
in a row. In 2007, a total of 14,670 episodes were produced, which was twice the amount in 2000. 





infrastructure and low revenue. A serious issue was that more than 40% of drama series 
produced were not broadcast for a variety of reasons and were stashed in storage (Gang & Yi, 
2009:27). Thus, it is not surprising that people who were part of the Chinese drama industry 
became antagonistic towards hallyu at its height in the mid-2000s, as Korean series were 
robbing them of the opportunity to broadcast their own shows (Nam, 2011:39-41).  
After Daejanggeum was broadcast in 2005, efforts to curb imports of Korean drama 
series began to materialize. Public opinion sided with the complaints of the Chinese 
production companies. It was argued that Korean dramas were receiving special treatment in 
the Chinese market. Critics demanded that broadcasting of Korean dramas be reduced to 
protect the domestic drama industry.13   
The Chinese government embraced this sentiment by limiting the number of hours a day 
and time slots a foreign drama series could be broadcast. Furthermore, it made screening 
standards stricter and virtually placed a limit on the number of Korean drama imports by 
adopting a policy to diversify the number of foreign countries it imported from. The 
government’s policy direction moved towards protecting and developing the domestic arts 
and cultural industry. As a result, Korean drama imports dropped drastically from 2006 
onward. 
Despite there being these areas of conflict, media industries in both countries sought 
ways to cooperate. Not stopping at merely importing and then broadcasting Korean TV 
shows, they endeavored to make profits using the popularity of Korean drama series and 
hallyu stars.14 The most common method was to use hallyu stars as the leads in domestic 
dramas by entering into a contract with Korean entertainment management agencies. Jae-
wook Ahn in “Apartment” (Bailinggongyu), In-pyo Cha in “The Four” (Sidamingbu), Na-ra 
Jang in “My Bratty Princess” (Diaomangongzhu), and most recently, Seo-hee Jang in “Chef 
Lin in Seoul” (Linshifu zai Shouer) are some of the most successful cases. This method of 
utilizing the popularity of hallyu stars to secure high ratings is still widely adopted.  
Joint production is another method that has been actively promoted. Korean production 
companies usually invest capital and provide essential production components, including 
personnel. For instance, “Lostway” (Milu) is a co-production by China’s Shanghai Media 
Group and Korea’s Samhwa Networks. The Korean company provided original work, that is 
KBS drama series “My Husband’s Woman” (Nampyeonui Yeoja), director (Yong-woo 
Chang),  and lead characters (Jong Won Lee, Ae Shin). “Love Strategy” (Lianaibingfa) was 
also a series jointly produced with Chinese and Korean investments and, like “Lostway”, the 
core elements were supplied by Korea. Even though the series was co-produced, it was 
registered as a Chinese product, because otherwise it could not be aired during prime time. 
                                                          
There were only 432 drama production units in 2003, which increased to 2,511 in 2007 (Gang and Yi, 
2009:25). 
13 Of course, there were, albeit weaker, other voices. Blatant attacks on Korean dramas by industry 
leaders, media commentators, and netizens were countered by the voice that, speaking highly of the 
overall quality of Korean dramas, demanded more effort on the side of Chinese producers (Leung, 
2008:67; Yun, 2006:57-65).  
14 The renting of other East Asian popular culture in the media industry reflects the need for a greater 
variety of cultural content in an age of fast industrial change. With the onset of globalization, 
domestic and foreign TV shows, films, online games, mobile games are all engaged in a competition 
to procure more consumers. To survive in this competitive environment, it is vital for local 
broadcasting stations to diversify strategies (Lim, 2008).  
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For Korea, joint production is an alternative route for penetrating the Chinese market under 
the current policy of import diversification. China has much to gain from cooperating with 
Korea in terms of attracting financing, improving the quality of products, expanding the sales 
network and so on.  
Considering the fact that only a small number of Korean films can enter the Chinese 
market, the chance of industrial collision occurring in the film industry is not so high as in 
the drama industry, except on the issue of copyright protection. Apart from the sales of 
finished products, a variety of collaborative projects have been produced in the film industry 
(Korea Film Council, 2011:141-167).   
Collaboration between Korean and Chinese film industry began with simple assistance on 
the Chinese side in finding filming locations for Korean films. Recently, however, joint 
productions have become increasingly diverse. Both countries cooperate on issues such as 
filming location, personnel (actors, director, staff), and the planning, production, investment, 
marketing of a film. For example, when filming “Anarchists,” CineWorld hired a Korean 
director, Korean actors for the core characters, and Korean staff members for some parts, 
leaving the rest (costume, art direction, props, supporting actors and extras, set, location, and 
the like) to the co-producing Chinese company. On “Three Kingdoms: Resurrection of the 
Dragon” (Samgukji: Yonguibuhwal), the co-producing Chinese company was responsible for 
securing the director and actors, while the Korean partner took care of everything else from 
investment and production to distribution. There are a substantial number of multinational 
film projects such as “Seven Swords” (Chilgeom), which was jointly invested in by Korea, 
China, Hong Kong and Japan. Korea’s Boram Entertainment took the lead in planning the 
project, but actual production was led by Hong Kong and China. The role of Korean and 
Japanese companies was largely restricted to supplying actors and technological support. 
Films such as “Daisy,” “The Promise” (Mugeuk), “Battle of Wits” (Mukgong), “Red Cliff” 
(Jeokbyeokdaejeon), “A Good Rain Knows” (Housijeol) and “Sophie’s Revenge” (Sopiui 
Yeonaemaenyueol) show that the film industries of the two countries are combining forces to 
penetrate into the Korean, Chinese, Asian, and international market. 
The music industry still faces many problems on the issue of cooperation. It is true that 
individual Korean singers and bands boast large Chinese fandoms, but K-pop comes up 
against difficulties when trying to expand to the Chinese market. All businesses including 
album releases, concerts, and digital music sales face various bumps in the road ahead. 
Releasing albums has two problems. First, there is weak demand since the great majority 
of those who enjoy K-pop are young Chinese whose buying power is limited. A bigger issue 
is piracy. Infringement of copyrights is socially tolerated in China. Since the price gap 
between the real product and a pirated one is so large, piracy is prevalent.15 Piracy is a 
problem of serious magnitude to the extent that the same factory manufactures real products 
during the day and switches to pirated ones at night (Maliangkay, 2010). Due to such 
practice Korean companies are reluctant to invest in releasing albums in China.  
Producing concerts is not easy either. Upon the success of H.O.T.’s Beijing concert in 
2000, Korean music companies came to believe that China’s music market had a great 
potential. Despite the Chinese government’s strict approval procedures and sanctions and 
heated disputes with local agencies on profit-sharing and contract details, a substantial 
                                                          
15 According to some research agencies, it is estimated that 85% of sales are pirated products in the 
case of music CDs (Maliangkay, 2010:35). Pease (2010), quoting a person working in the Chinese 
music industry, says that the ratio of pirated Korean CDs to real ones is between 5:1 to 7:1.  





number of Korean singers and bands had the chance to perform live before their Chinese fans. 
But, few made money from these concerts. If there had been no sponsorships from Korean 
corporations that used hallyu to improve their image, the profitability problem could have 
been worse.16  
Like albums, profits from digital music sales are low due to chronic piracy. The 
combined effort by the Chinese government and music industry to stop piracy has proven 
largely ineffective and illegal downloading of music files is still prevalent. Yet, with new 
online services that encourage legal distribution of digital music and the government's 
stricter dealings with copyright issues, it is likely that the situation will improve in the long 
run. Korean and Chinese music industries will accordingly strengthen mutual cooperation in 
online music sales.  
 
 
5. ANTI-HALLYU MOVEMENT AND NATIONALIST DISCOURSES 
 
Figuratively speaking, hallyu is a stage upon which mutual misunderstanding and friction 
in other realms of the Korea-China relationship are played out. Korean pop culture has 
potential as an engine for transnational connectivity, but it often gets involved in a war of 
words in which national interests and pride are at stake. What is usually called anti-hallyu 
(banhallyu) or counter-hallyu (hanghallyu) movement tells the story.  
The anti-hallyu movement is not a well-planned one with the purpose of blocking Korean 
popular culture from entering the Chinese market,17 but a wide variety of critical voices 
about Korean pop culture that are expressed by the media and netizens. It fluctuates 
considerably and reflects what is going on between the two countries at a certain time. 
According to Yun (2006:57-65), it was in the mid-2000s when drama hallyu reached its 
pinnacle with the Daejanggeum fever that many Chinese voiced worries, discontent and 
antagonism towards hallyu. Strong antagonism has largely subsided, but criticisms on certain 
elements of hallyu continue to surface through the Chinese media and internet.     
There are diverse anti-hallyu voices in China. There is an abundance of direct criticisms 
of Korean cultural products and pop stars. For example, Korean TV dramas are often 
criticized for repetitive stereotypical stories, lack of variety in subjects, too many 
coincidental elements, and the like. Entertainment news tend to focus on individual stars and 
their behavioral problems, which include arrogance, bad manners, and the narrow-
mindedness of seeing China only as another market to make money from. Another line of 
criticism concerns hallyu’s negative effects on Chinese audiences, especially youthful ones 
among whom Hallyu finds most passionate fans known as ‘hahanzu.’18 Hallyu, it is worried, 
can mislead young Chinese and prevent them from growing up in a normal way.19    
                                                          
16 Despite these problems, Korean singers continue to hold concerts in China. They do so because they 
know that Chinese fans think highly of celebrities who are considerate of their fans and that concerts 
are a symbol of the sincere bond between singers and fans (Pease, 2010).  
17 According to a recent survey of Chinese media reports, there is not much that can be called anti-
hallyu movement per se (Yi et al., 2009:61-71).  
18 Literally, ‘hahanzu’ means a ‘crazed for Korea’ tribe. ‘Hanmi’ (Korea maniac) is another term the 
Chinese media often used to refer to these enthusiastic hallyu fans.  
19 Yet, it should be noted that such a criticism is not specifically aimed at hallyu. Any foreign popular 
culture can be blamed for that.   
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Harsher criticisms are leveled at, not the phenomenon itself, but its economic, political, 
and sociocultural implications. First of all, trade imbalance in cultural products is an issue. 
As described earlier, many Chinese people in the cultural industry showed their 
dissatisfaction with trade imbalance in TV dramas. They accused Korea, which was enjoying 
a dramatic increase in drama exports, of not willing to increase imports of Chinese cultural 
products.20 One Chinese scholar represents this voice in a somewhat subdued manner (Lu, 
2007:54).     
 
We believe that for China to become an equal partner of complete cultural exchange, we need 
to slow down the import of Korean drama series through an indirect method (slackening the pace of 
official screening of Korean dramas). This is merely a trade balancing strategy. I believe that, if 
Korean friends want to resolve the problem [of the dwindling drama exports to China], they should 
come up with a solution to tackle the trade imbalance problem that both sides can agree on, so that 
hallyu can thrive in China. I am saying this, because the Chinese audience likes and loves hallyu.  
 
Similar voices appear from time to time on the Chinese media, ranging from critical 
comments on the Korean cultural industry’s interest in short-term gains, to broader 
accusations of Korea’s trade protectionism. Sometimes the blame is aimed at the Korean 
government. Hallyu as it is today, they believe, could not have been possible without the all-
out support of the government.21 Seeing it as a state-level project to expand economic gains 
and deepen cultural influence, they find the trade deficit in cultural commodities even more 
unfair.  
The case of anti-daejanggeum narratives shows how an economic dispute can turn into a 
war of cultural nationalism (Leung, 2008). It was a well-known drama producer in mainland 
China, Guoli Zhang, who vocalized the first anti-daejanggeum sentiments in 2005. He first 
criticized daejanggeum’s content and furthermore accused the drama of cultural theft, having 
claimed as Korean what must be Chinese cultural heritage (acupuncture, for example). This 
was soon followed by a torrent of patriotic responses on the web. Hallyu fans and Hunan TV 
that broadcast the drama were called traitors by Producer Zhang and Chinese netizens. There 
emerged an equally vociferous defense for the drama. This incident is a classic example of 
cultural nationalism creeping into the realm of popular culture.  
Much of what we consider the anti-hallyu movement, in fact, comes from debates outside 
the realm of popular culture. As a Chinese scholar put it, “disputes on the issue of ‘Korea in 
                                                          
20 In contrast to the amount of Korean drama exports to China at 9.31 million US dollars in 2005, the 
amount of Chinese drama imports to Korea was at a mere 1.48 million dollars. In 2008, both amounts 
dropped sharply, the prior being 4.51 million dollars and the latter 0.60 million dollars. Korea’s drama 
exports to China bounced back in 2010, with the earnings of 15.57 million dollars, but drama imports 
from China amounted to 0.39 million dollars only (KOCCA Chinese Office, 2012). While some 
Chinese drama series were being aired on Korean cable channels, ratings were low. Taking into 
consideration China’s grievances about trade inequality, KOFICE is importing Chinese shows and 
airing them on Junghwa TV and other channels (Gwon and Gim, 2009:144-145).   
21 In fact, various government agencies have played a significant role in promoting hallyu. The Korean 
Culture and Contents Agency (KOCCA), which was set up in 2001 to specifically support cultural 
industries at home and facilitate cultural exports and exchange, is a good example. Other government 
agencies including the Korean National Tourism Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
are also involved in various projects promoting hallyu.  





the eyes of the Chinese’ or ‘China in the eyes of the Koreans’ continue endlessly on the 
internet, outside the television screen, while there is a Korean TV drama boom” (Zhang, 
2006:144). Nationalistic sentiments often find ways to implicate hallyu in heated debates on 
Korea-China relations in other realms. Noteworthy is the cyber dispute that occurred in the 
mid-2000s upon the registration of Korea’s Gangneung Dano festival on the UNESCO 
cultural heritage list.  
This festival has its origin in Chinese Duanwu, sharing the name and the date (the fifth 
day of the fifth month on the lunar calendar). But, as a localized tradition, it is largely 
different from the Duanwu festival. It is a month-long festival with two main activities, 
namely, the performance of exorcism and folk entertainment such as mask dances, swings, 
and traditional wrestling, none of which was performed during the Duanwu festival. Soon, 
there was a flurry of criticism on the internet that accused Korea of registering Chinese 
cultural heritage as its own. Many Chinese netizens were furious, because they believed that 
the festival was a variation of Chinese Duanwu, and that it was China, not Korea, which had 
the right to file such an application. Although there were some different perspectives on the 
issue of the ownership of cultural heritage, the prevailing view was that China should have 
the upper hand. Some even accused Korea of stealing Chinese cultural assets. A heated war 
of words with a nationalistic tone broke out, as many Korean netizens, offended by the 
abrasive comments of Chinese people, immediately backfired with equally abusive language. 
The initial furor over the registration of the Gangneung Dano festival eventually died down, 
but this led to the establishment of national policies to protect cultural heritage and promote 
traditional festivals in China (Park, 2010).  
Nationalistic sentiments sparked by such an issue often spill over into negative reactions 
to hallyu. Many Chinese netizens and media commentators accused Daejanggeum and other 
Korean (especially history) dramas of portraying Chinese with certain prejudices, distorting 
historical facts on China, and showing strong nationalism (Leung, 2008). Although some 
criticisms have proven to be groundless as in the case involving Confucius’ ethnic origin, 
there still remains much antagonism towards Korean popular culture and its nationalistic 
flavor. Unlike China’s young hallyu fans who do not care about their stars’ nationality (Pease, 
2009), nationality matters to most other young Chinese.  
Since overseas markets have become so important to cultural contents companies in 
Korea, they take precautions not to stir up nationalistic sentiments among overseas audiences. 
Examples such as “The Story of the Great King's Four Gods (Taewangsasingi), a historical 
cum Kung Fu drama, which removed substantial historical details from drama characters, 
show how debates occurring outside the television screen affect cultural production itself. 
Despite such efforts, however, it will not be easy for cultural contents companies in both 
countries to prevent disputes on other issues from spilling over into their own field, because 
nationalism today shows strong gripping power among younger generations as well as old 
nationalists. Furthermore, news media, whose survival depends on the amount of attention 
they get from the masses, often add fuel to the fire. Not only do mass media facilitate 
interchanges of criticism by broadcasting the reactions of the other country, but they also 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Speaking of the implications for the Korea-China relationship, Hallyu is like a double-
bladed knife. It can cause conflicts as well as encourage collaboration. The Korean and 
Chinese cultural industries will continue to compete and cooperate with each other, as they 
adapt to the rapid changes in domestic, regional and global markets. There will be more 
competition than cooperation in the drama industry, perhaps. As the case of the Hunan 
Satellite TV exemplifies, the level of Chinese drama production has moved up a notch 
(Leung, 2008), and with Chinese viewers’ interest shifting to dramas from other foreign 
countries, Korean dramas will probably face stronger competition in the future. At the same 
time, collaboration in the cultural industry as a whole is likely to be widened and diversified. 
We will see more collaborative projects in East Asia in the production and distribution of TV 
dramas, films, and music. It will be interesting to see if this can lead to a blossoming of East 
Asian cultural hybridities that can transcend rigid national boundaries and nationalist 
discourses characterizing the current politics in the region (Mori, 2008).  
As we have discussed, hallyu helped boost Chinese people’s interest in and change their 
perception of Korea. Through popular culture, they came to know Korea more concretely 
and intimately. Hallyu reminded them of the two countries’ common cultural background, 
that is, Eastern culture based on Confucian traditions. At the same time, it made them realize 
that they shared a lot with Koreans in everyday life. Then, can the sense of cultural affinity 
hallyu generates among its fans develop into counter-hegemonic political potential which can 
effectively contain the reemerging political ideologies of chauvinistic nationalism and 
militant patriotism?  
Noticing signs of transborder dialogue between Asian audiences caused by increased 
transnational flows of popular culture in the region, scholars like Hae-Joang Cho (2005) and  
Wondam Baek (2005) answered positively to the question. According to them, hallyu and 
other cultural flows in the region, which augment transborder communication and exchange, 
can lead to the shaping of an Asian consciousness. To me, this is more like a wishful 
thinking than a realistic projection. As Iwabuchi (2009) notes, political and economic 
structural restraints can severely hamper the publicness of media culture and the possibility 
of transborder dialogue. In the case of hallyu in China, it is hard to imagine that its Chinese 
fans will be able to create a counter-hegemonic discourse which may be placed on the same 
plane with nationalist discourses. There is no doubt that hallyu promotes transnational 
connectivity between Chinese and Korean fans to some degree. Yet, the question is if its 
holding power can be strong enough to resist the emotionally charged narratives of 
nationalism (Jang, 2005). 
Friction and collision will occur both within and outside the realm of popular culture. It is 
unrealistic to expect that we will be able to come up with certain miracle solutions to stop 
that. What we can do is to prevent disputes in one problem area from spilling over into other 
area, to make efforts to subdue militant nationalism that can be detrimental to the 
relationship between the two countries, and continue to find areas of collaboration and 
mutual benefits.  
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